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SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
THOMAS E. BUCK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43252
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2014-7667
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Thomas E. Buck pled guilty to one count of
aggravated assault and one count of possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. He received a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed,
and the court retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Buck contends that the district court
abused its discretion by relinquishing its jurisdiction, and by failing to reduce his
sentence or place him on probation in light of the additional information submitted in
conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 21, 2014, thirty-three year old Thomas Buck pointed an airsoft gun at the
driver of a Hyundai Elantra and told him “The car’s been paid for, leave the keys.”
(R., pp.13-14.) Apparently Mr. Buck was trying to help out a friend who had just had
foot surgery. (R., p.15.) Mr. Buck’s friend had purchased the Elantra from the driver,
but the driver “repossessed” the car when Mr. Buck’s friend failed to make the final
payment. (R., pp.14-15.) When law enforcement arrived, Mr. Buck was searched and a
plastic bag containing a substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine was
located in his pocket. (R., p.15.)
Mr. Buck was charged by information with one count of aggravated assault, with
a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, and one count of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.66-68.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Buck pled guilty to one count of aggravated
assault and one count of possession of methamphetamine. (11/17/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.124; R., p.119.)

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend

concurrent sentences of five years, with three years fixed, but that the district court
retain jurisdiction. (11/17/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-14; R., p.108.) The district court accepted
the plea, but did not order a Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, PSI) or a mental
health assessment as defense counsel represented that he intended to waive the
preparation of any investigation or evaluation in order to hasten Mr. Buck’s sentencing
hearing. (11/17/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-18, p.19, L.6 – p.21, L.9; 11/24/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-12;
R., p.119.)

The defense stipulated to the sentences recommended by the State.
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(11/17/14 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9.) The matter was set for sentencing. (11/17/14 Tr., p.21,
Ls.6-10; R., p.120.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court followed the stipulations of the parties
and sentenced Mr. Buck to an aggregate unified term of five years, with two years fixed,
but retained jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days. (11/24/14 Tr., p.6, L.19
– p.8, L.19; R., pp.122-128.)
Thereafter the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing and
ordered Mr. Buck to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed. (R., pp.134138.) Mr. Buck filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.141-143.)
Mr. Buck then filed timely pro se I.C.R. 35 Motion (hereinafter, Rule 35) seeking
a reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.150-152.) The district court denied Mr. Buck’s Rule
35 motion without a hearing. (R., pp.163-166.) Mr. Buck timely appeals from the order
relinquishing jurisdiction, and the district court’s order denying Mr. Buck’s I.C.R.
35 motion.
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Buck?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Buck’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Buck
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.

State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). “The decision to place a defendant on probation or
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion.”

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App.

2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original
judgment. Id. at 289.
Mr. Buck contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction without a hearing where it specifically relied on several documents, including
“the presentence investigation in this case.” (R., p.134.) However, this reliance is
plainly incorrect as a PSI was not prepared in Mr. Buck’s case. 1 Thus, the district court

Because defense counsel agreed to waive the preparation of a PSI and a mental
health evaluation, Mr. Buck, who had been previously been diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia, ADD/ADHD, PTSD, Bi-Polar Disorder, Anti-Social Disorder, and
Depression, proceeded to the custody of Idaho Department of Correction and was
placed on a period of retained jurisdiction without information about his background or
the severity of his mental health conditions. Mr. Buck was subsequently removed from
the retained jurisdiction programming due in large part to his mental health issues.
Should this Court grant Mr. Buck relief by placing him on probation, a presentence
investigation will need to be prepared prior to placement on probation as required by
I.C. § 20-220.

1
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based its decision to relinquish jurisdiction, in part, on a document that was never
created.
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Buck was making progress while on
the retained jurisdiction and his accomplishments would lead to a successful probation.
This district court found that “the Defendant’s choice to refuse to meaningfully
participate in the programming recommended by CAPP staff indicates that the
Defendant is not a candidate for probation at this time” and relinquished its jurisdiction
over Mr. Buck. (R., p.136.) The district court found that “the Defendant simply refuses
to learn from the programming offered to him” (R., p.136); however, this is not a
reasonable conclusion after considering the totality of the information contained in the
APSI.
Although Mr. Buck received two formal disciplinary sanctions while on his rider,
much of his problematic conduct was due to his mental health conditions. 2 (APSI, p.3.)
While the first DOR was for behavior, specifically, Mr. Buck was being argumentative
with a corrections officer and refused to redirect his behavior, the second DOR Mr. Buck
received was due to his possession of a prescription pill. (APSI, p.3.) As he explained,
“I hid one of my pills to take in the morning because I was having anziete attcts [sic] in
the A.M.” (APSI, p.3.) Mr. Buck was removed from programming a short period of time
after the second DOR. (APSI, p.4.)
While the district court did accurately note that on March 11, 2015, Mr. Buck
reportedly asked his counselor for permission to “just do the bare minimum in the
program,” Mr. Buck did complete some of the work in this class before he was removed
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for his second DOR. (APSI, pp.4.) On March 27, 2015, it was noted that Mr. Buck was
becoming more aware of his feelings and the physical cues associated with both
positive and negative feelings. (APSI, p.10.)
Before Mr. Buck received the DORs, he was making progress in his
programming. According to his counselor, Mr. Buck “had started accepting feedback
from his peers and was compliant in class.” (APSI, p.4.) Mr. Buck was open and willing
to participate in group and was a good group member. (APSI, p.13.) He had been
made the Classroom Bathroom Monitor, as voted by his peers.

(APSI, p.12.)

Additionally, Mr. Buck was realizing and admitting that his methamphetamine use was a
big problem in his life.3 (APSI, p.4.) He “committed to using thought stoppers regularly
in order to help him cope with his faulty beliefs and cravings.” (APSI, p.4.) Mr. Buck
demonstrated a willingness to change and his number one goal was to stay clean.
(APSI, p.13.) Mr. Buck exhibited good progress during the time he was in the rider
program, and was more than 50% of the way through his classes when he was
removed from programming. (APSI, pp.4, 8-9.)
At the time of his guilty plea, Mr. Buck was taking prescribed medications to
manage his mental health conditions. (11/17/14 Tr., p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.3, p.6, L.24 – p.7,
L.23.) Mr. Buck suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and has difficulty discerning reality
from non-reality without the proper dosage of medication. (11/17/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-23.)
Mr. Buck wrote to the district court during his rider to say that his mental health
medications had been adjusted and he was feeling the best he had ever felt. (APSI,

Mr. Buck had been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD, PTSD, Bi-Polar Disorder, Anti-Social
Disorder, Depression, and Schizophrenia. (R., p.110.)
3 Mr. Buck starting using methamphetamine at age 13. (APSI, p.13.)
2
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p.7.) Mr. Buck asked the district court to place him on probation or in mental health
court. (ASPI, p.7.)
The district court relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Buck even though he had
been making progress in his programming and exhibited a desire to change his criminal
thinking and behavior. (APSI, p.4.)
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Buck’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused
its discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Buck.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Buck’s Rule 35 Motion For
A Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Submitted
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Mr. Buck contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its
jurisdiction over him and that his sentence should have been reduced in light of the new
information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. Mr. Buck asserts the
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district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of
discretion.
Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. Buck’s case, all of which indicate
that a more lenient sentence would be appropriate, particularly in light of factors such
as: Mr. Buck’s mental health conditions, his drug addiction, and the fact that Mr. Buck
was grieving the loss of his wife.4 (R., p.151.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires
the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Here, Mr. Buck suffers from schizophrenia and he
was not taking his mental health medications when he committed the instant offenses.
(R., p.151.)
In addition to his mental health issues, Mr. Buck struggles with an addiction to
controlled substances. (R., p.151.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance
abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court
imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme
Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for
treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that
ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of
conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981).
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Mr. Buck had utilized the grief and loss programming while on his rider. (APSI, p.7.)
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Finally, Mr. Buck had ample time in prison to reflect on his bad choice and bad
behavior. (R., p.151.) Mr. Buck wants to be an asset to the community, a good role
model, and a productive member of society. (R., p.151.)
In light of Mr. Buck’s mental health issues, his controlled substance abuse, and
the new information before the district court regarding his resolve to change his life, the
district court should have reduced his sentence or placed him on probation.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing
to reduce Mr. Buck’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Buck respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order that
he be placed on probation. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the
district court for a new rider review hearing or that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 8th day of October, 2015.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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